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Oocyte donation has played an increasingly important role in assisted reproductive technologies since the early 1980s. Over the past
30 years, unique legal standards have evolved to address issues in the oocyte donation procedure itself as well as the disputes over issues,
such as parentage, that inevitably arise with new technologies, particularly for individuals seeking to build nontraditional families. This
essay will explore oocyte donation's legal aspects as well as seminal law concerning the procedure, including statutory law (uniform and
model provisions and enacted state laws) and selected judicial opinions concerning surrogacy and parentage, testing of oocyte donors,
mix-ups of donated oocytes, and donor compensation. (Fertil Steril 2018;110:1209–15.2018 by American Society for Reproductive
Medicine.)
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I n vitro fertilization (IVF) usingdonor oocytes is undoubtedly animportant assisted reproductive
technology (ART) procedure in the
United States; in 2015, donor eggs
were used in 19,482 ART cycles (7,331
fresh and 12,151 frozen); 4% of women
under the age of 35 years used donor
eggs, compared with 34% of women
aged 43–44 and 71% of women over
44 years (1). The percentage of
oocyte-donor embryo transfers result-
ing in live births is consistently above
5% (1). Today, oocyte donation is
particularly useful for women who
lack functioning ovaries, are of
advanced reproductive age, or risk
passing genetic conditions to offspring
(2), as well as for men, single individ-
uals, and same-sex couples who lack
ready access to oocytes or experience
poor oocyte quality or ovarian reserve.
Oocyte donation is a fairly recent
development; during the first U.S. pro-
cedure in 1983 at the Harbor UCLA
Medical Center, Dr. John Buster
removed an embryo from a donor's
uterus with the use of lavage and trans-
ferred it to an intended mother's uterus
(3), leading to the first live birth from a
donor oocyte in 1984 (2). Initially,
donated oocytes came from an in-
tended mother's close friends and rela-
tives (‘‘known donation’’) or from other
women undergoing IVF willing to
donate surplus oocytes—a practice that
rapidly declined with the advent of em-
bryo cryopreservation (4). In the late
1980s, great demand and dwindling
supply motivated fertility clinics to
begin recruiting donors from the gen-
eral population; initially, donors were
unpaid, but clinics began to advertise
for paid donors around 1990 (typically
offering $2,000–$2,500) (4). In 1991,
one of the first commercial oocyte
donation programs opened in Califor-
nia (4).
In general, sperm donation laws
have paved the way for both social
acceptance of oocyte donation and
legal protections for intended parents
(4). But obvious differences between
sperm and oocyte donation and
different real-world consequences
necessitated that these procedures be
regulated by different legal standards.
This essay considers legal aspects and
seminal case law concerning oocyte
donation. We first discuss professional
American Society for Reproductive
Medicine (ASRM) guidelines regarding
oocyte donation that have both
informed and drawn on legal statutes
and judicial opinions, after which we
discuss relevant statutory law,
including uniform and model provi-
sions and enacted state laws. Finally,
we discuss a number of judicial opin-
ions concerning surrogacy and
parentage, testing of oocyte donors,





ASRM has issued ethics and practice
committee opinions concerning several
topics related to oocyte donation,
including use of family members,
financial compensation, disclosure of
medical errors, oocyte donation to
women of advanced reproductive age,
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posthumous retrieval and use, informed consent (including
for donation for research purposes), informing offspring of
their conception, third-party ART misconduct, and interests,
obligations, and rights in gamete donation. Adherence to
both practice and ethics guidelines is a requirement of
ASRM membership (5). Although these standards lack the
force of law, they provide essential evidence for establishing
the medical standard of care in civil medical malpractice suits.
ASRM Practice Committee guidelines urge physicians to
‘‘strongly recommend counseling by a qualified mental health
professional to all intended parents using donor gametes’’ (6),
as well as psychosocial evaluation and counseling for poten-
tial gamete donors and their partners. In general, programs
must inform donors and recipients about pertinent legal,
medical, and emotional issues, medical screening, and infor-
mation sharing, and counsel them that the donation relation-
ship is life-long and subject to ‘‘evolving medical technology,
laws, and social standards’’ (7). The ASRM Ethics Committee
has noted that minimal obligations include authorizing
‘‘disclosure of nonidentifying medical information where
appropriate’’ and recommended that these issues be discussed
in the consent process, together with the possibility that legal
and policy changes could make ‘‘promises of anonymity or
future contact’’ unenforceable (7).
Moreover, ASRM Ethics Committee opinions suggest that
programs limit the number of times a woman can undergo
retrieval for donation purposes and make ‘‘good-faith efforts’’
to avoid frequent oocyte donors (8); ASRM Practice Commit-
tee standards recommend limiting donors to six stimulated
cycles (9). Use of adult relatives as gamete donors or surro-
gates is generally acceptable if they are not consanguineous,
do not involve child-to-parent donations, or simulate inces-
tuous unions (e.g., ovum donation from sister to brother's
wife); such arrangements, however, may require additional
screening and counseling (10). ASRM ethical guidelines sug-
gest that women of advanced reproductive age (over 45 years)
considering donor oocytes undergo comprehensive medical
and psychosocial evaluation and counseling, and they
discourage providing donor oocytes to women over 55 year
old (11). Programs can ethically decline to provide treatment
based on ‘‘well grounded reasons that those patients will be
unable to provide minimally adequate or safe care for
offspring’’ (12).
According to ASRM Ethics Committee guidelines,
financial compensation of oocyte donors is justified, and
should be ‘‘structured to acknowledge the time, inconve-
nience, and discomfort associated with screening, ovarian
stimulation, and oocyte retrieval’’ but not based on the oo-
cytes' planned use, number or quality retrieved, number or
outcome of previous donation cycles, or ethnic or personal
characteristics (8). Financial compensation includes both
payments to women donating oocytes for others’ use,
and reduced IVF costs for women undergoing IVF who
provide some oocytes to another patient (8). Payments
should not ‘‘become undue inducements that will lead do-
nors to discount risks’’ (8). Physicians owe oocyte donors
the same duties as other patients, and programs should
adopt and disclose policies concerning payment of medical
costs for donor complications (7).
Finally, ASRM Ethics Committee guidelines authorize
physicians to disclose material information when a third-
party reproduction participant refuses to do so (13). Programs
should also have ‘‘rigorous procedures’’ to prevent ‘‘loss,
degradation, or misdirection of gametes and embryos’’ and
ensure proper identification; and clinics have an ‘‘ethical obli-
gation to disclose errors,’’ and must disclose errors in which




In addition to professional guidelines, a number of statutory
laws govern oocyte donation and parentage thereafter. These
statutory laws can be classified into two groups: 1) uniform
laws or model acts; and 2) enacted state laws. The 1984 Na-
tional Organ Transplant Act (15) makes it illegal to buy and
sell certain body parts or tissues for specific purposes but
expressly excludes renewable tissue such as sperm and blood.
Although eggs are not renewable, it has generally been
accepted that compensating egg donors for their ‘‘time, effort,
and inconvenience’’ is also not prohibited (16).
Uniform Laws and Model Acts
The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), a set of rules for establish-
ing parentage that state legislatures can adopt in part or in en-
tirety, was first approved in 1973 by the Uniform Conference
of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, a nonprofit associ-
ation formed in 1892 to ensure uniformity of state law in
certain crucial areas (such as family law). The Uniform Con-
ference is composed of more than 300 volunteer members
of the bar (usually practitioners, judges, and law professors).
No uniform law is effective until a state legislature adopts
it. Uniform laws have been approved for several subjects;
for example, the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) also addresses
ART-related parentage and inheritance issues. The UPA
(1973) was revised in 2002 and 2017.
The UPA (1973) legitimated children conceived from
sperm donation, was widely adopted by the majority of states,
and formed the cornerstone for most state donor insemination
and parentage laws (17). It provided that sperm donors
providing gametes to physicians were not legal parents but
was silent regarding oocyte donors (likely because it was
approved before oocyte donation was technologically
feasible). Revisions in 2002 streamlined several provisions,
incorporating a paternity registry and nonjudicial procedures
for acknowledging paternity, genetic testing, authorizing sur-
rogacy agreements, and surrogacy parentage determinations.
Critically, following the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in
Obergefell v. Hodges (18) in 2015 (establishing the constitu-
tionality of same-sex marriage) and Pavan v. Smith (19) in
2017 (upholding same-sex parents' right to be listed on chil-
dren's birth certificates), the UPA 2017 revision amends
several provisions to ensure equal treatment of same-sex cou-
ples' children and equal recognition of intended parents
regardless of sex, sexual orientation, or marital status (17).
Finally, for the first time, UPA (2017) article 9 addresses
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‘‘rights of donor-conceived persons to access medical and
identifying information’’; it does not require that donors'
identities be disclosed but requires that donors be asked
whether they would like their identities disclosed, allows do-
nors who choose nondisclosure to later change their minds,
and requires good-faith efforts to disclose donors' nonidenti-
fying medical history to donor-conceived persons upon
request. UPA 2017 has been enacted in Washington and Ver-
mont, is pending in Rhode Island, and is anticipated to be
introduced in several others states in upcoming legislative
terms (20).
In addition to the UPA, in 2008 the American Bar Associ-
ation (ABA) proposed the Model Act Governing Assisted
Reproductive Technology (‘‘ABA Model Act’’) after a 15-
year drafting project that incorporated many organizations.
Its purpose was to create ‘‘a flexible framework of legal rights,
obligations, and protections to the stakeholders in ART,’’
including ‘‘patients, participants, parents, providers, and the
resulting children and their siblings’’ (21). Like the UPA, state
legislatures must enact ABAModel Act provisions before they
have legal force; no state has yet adopted it. It also includes
standards for documented informed consent and mandatory
disclosures, including recommendations to seek legal counsel.
Under the ABA Model Act, a gamete donor is not considered
to be a parent of a child conceived through ART; an individual
who provides gametes with the intent to parent is a parent and
not a donor. Donors can remain anonymous if they provide
nonidentifying health information (an increasingly
unrealistic provision given the growing popularity of direct-
to-consumer genetic testing). Donors can place nondiscrimi-
natory conditions on their donations; these provisions must
be set forth in writing prior to the donation. Donor compen-
sation must be reasonable and not conditioned on gamete
quality or genetic traits. The ABA Model Act requires that
all third-party reproduction participants must meet in person
with a licensed Master- or Ph.D.-level mental health
professional.
Enacted State Laws
Few states have laws applying to oocyte donation; existing
state laws regarding parentage are most often modeled after
the UPA provisions for sperm donation. According to Swain
(4), in 2014 fewer than 15 states had laws addressing egg
donation, leaving many participants with no ‘‘absolute assur-
ance that the intended mother would be considered a legal
parent.’’ But remarkably few oocyte donation conflicts have
resulted in case law—a development perhaps attributed to
‘‘carefully drawn safeguards, now practiced with regularity,’’
and ‘‘a general contentment with the practice of donation’’ (4).
A few states, such as California after high-profile embryo and
gamete mix-ups there, have enacted laws requiring specific
procedures and disclosures before gamete or embryo dona-
tion. Under the California statute, a physician's failure to
obtain required written consent or unauthorized use of ge-
netic material carries potential criminal and civil liability
(22). New York's reproductive tissue bank regulations go
further, allowing reproductive tissue donors the right to with-
draw consent to donating stored gametes (requiring a gamete
donor's informed consent to include ‘‘a statement that the
reproductive tissue donor has the right to withdraw his/her
consent to donation up until such time that a specific recipient
has begun an assisted reproduction cycle in reliance on the
availability of tissue from that donor’’) (23).
The relative paucity of statutory and case law also means
that outcomes of existing conflicts are more difficult to pre-
dict, whether they concern parentage status, misuse of donor
eggs, or improper informed consent.
CASE LAW ADDRESSING OOCYTE DONATION
AND RELATED ISSUES
Case law regarding oocyte donors and oocyte donation re-
veals four general themes: donors’ ability to set conditions
in donation negotiations; establishing parenthood and non-
parenthood (primarily cases of surrogacy and divorcing
same-sex couples); testing donors for (and disclosing infor-
mation about) genetic conditions; and donor compensation
(price-fixing and taxation).
The first issue is theoretically the least controversial:
Oocyte donors can impose nondiscriminatory conditions on
recipients’ future use of their oocytes or any resulting em-
bryos (a donor cannot express willingness to donate only to
a heterosexual couple). If these conditions are included in
donation contracts with recruiting programs or with specific
recipients, intended parents cannot donate oocytes or result-
ing embryos to others either at all or without express written
permission (24). In Options National Fertility Registry v.
American Society for Reproductive Medicine (25), an oocyte
donor signed an oocyte donor program agreement consenting
to donate oocytes only to a couple at a Texas fertility clinic
but sued after learning that her oocytes were shared with
another couple without her authorization. The fertility clinic
and consulting physicians were found liable for failure to
comply with the agreement. Such issues will diminish in
importance, however, as egg donation programs become
more standardized and particularly as frozen egg banks
become more widely used.
Establishing Parenthood
When establishing parenthood in ART contexts, courts have
considered two legal issues: whether a woman who contrib-
utes an oocyte is a ‘‘donor’’ or an ‘‘intended parent’’; and
whether a woman who does not contribute her own oocyte
but intends to be a mother is a mother. These issues usually
occur in a few scenarios: third-party reproduction using sur-
rogacy, and divorcing couples where one partner claims the
other is not a parent. Both situations raise the question of
who is a parent (usually, a mother), based on one or more
characteristics such as genetic relationship, gestational preg-
nancy, legal process (adoption or parentage order), or intent
to parent.
Surrogacy. Intent to parent is likely determinative when
courts adjudicate who is the parent of children born from sur-
rogacy and oocyte donation. In the seminal custody dispute
case Johnson v. Calvert (26), the California Supreme Court
confronted the question of whether a gestational (surrogate)
VOL. 110 NO. 7 / DECEMBER 2018 1211
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relationship to a child was superior to a genetic relationship
when determining legal parentage. The court ruled that,
when the intended mother provides the oocyte, that intention
to procreate was a stronger legal indicium of parentage. Thus,
the ‘‘natural mother’’ was the woman who was genetically
related to the child and intended to parent—not the nonge-
netic surrogate who gestated the child.
How best to determine parentage after the use of donor
oocytes initially mired many trial courts in swamps of contra-
dictory and confusing legal doctrines. Ironically, courts
initially relied on the use of donor oocytes to deny women
legal parenthood. The trial court in In re Buzzanca (27), for
instance, initially ruled that a wife in a divorcing couple could
not be the legal mother of a child born through gestational
surrogacy because she had neither contributed the oocytes
nor given birth to the child—a finding reversed on appeal.
Other early cases featured divorcing husbands who used the
circumstances of their child's birth via sperm donation to
disclaim paternity; courts roundly repudiated such claims
(28) and determined that these fathers were liable for child
support and that their ex-wives were legal mothers (29).
Legally, a determination that a woman is an ‘‘oocyte
donor’’ means that she cannot be a parent. Courts usually
find it easier to adjudicate parental rights in gestational surro-
gacy (where surrogates gestate fetuses conceived either
through the intended mother's oocytes or donor oocytes)
than in genetic or traditional surrogacy (where surrogates pro-
vide both oocytes and gestational services). Usually, oocyte
donors for gestational surrogacy sign forms acknowledging
their nonparental rights before donation and relinquishing
any parental rights that the law might deem them to have.
One court stated that such an oocyte donor should be treated
like a sperm donor; both anonymously contribute genetic ma-
terial for payment and sign away all biologic, parental, and
legal rights to their gametes and any resulting children (30).
Moreover, courts have determined that use of an anony-
mous oocyte donor does not preclude a woman who gestates
and intends to parent a child from claiming parental status,
regardless of whether or not she has a partner or is married.
McDonald v. McDonald (28) featured a married couple who
conceived a child through IVF with the use of anonymous-
donor oocytes and the husband's sperm; when the couple
separated, the husband claimed a superior right to custody
because of his genetic relationship to the child. The court
found that, because both parents had expressed parental in-
tentions, the wife was the natural mother and the husband
did not have a superior custodial claim. Similarly, in In re
C.K.G. (31), an unmarried couple conceived triplets with
the use of anonymous-donor oocytes and the male partner's
sperm; both partners lived together and fulfilled parental re-
sponsibilities. After their relationship deteriorated, the fe-
male partner sued for custody and child support, and the
father asserted that she was not a parent because she was
not genetically related to the children. The court, however,
declared her the legal mother and granted her primary
custody.
In genetic surrogacy cases (the term which UPA 2017
adopts in lieu of ‘‘traditional’’ surrogacy), although the surro-
gate could be considered to be both an oocyte donor and a
gestational surrogate, courts usually do not regard them as
such. Although one court stated that an unmarried female
‘‘oocyte donor’’ who was also the gestational surrogate could
be considered to be a parent under the state's ART statute (32),
most courts do not consider genetic surrogates to be ‘‘oocyte
donors’’ for two reasons: their oocytes might not be fertilized
in vitro and are not implanted into another woman's uterus;
and, unlike an oocyte donor, they cannot be precluded from
claiming biologic or legal parenthood under most states'
adoption laws and public policies (33). In such cases, courts
may, however, look to the intention of the surrogate and
the intended parents, especially whether there are any agree-
ments or behaviors indicating whether or not the surrogate
would coparent (31). In addition, in most states, traditional
surrogates cannot be asked to relinquish parental rights until
after birth, and surrogacy contract provisions requiring such
commitments are legally unenforceable.
Divorcing or separating same-sex couples. Determining
parentage in cases involving same-sex parents who
conceived through ART also has posed many quandaries for
courts. When one woman in a committed lesbian relationship
provided her oocytes to her partner (usually after signing
standard ‘‘oocyte donor’’ clinic consent forms denying or re-
linquishing parental rights) and her partner gestated the re-
sulting pregnancy, was the genetic connection and
expressed intention to parent enough to establish parental
rights if the couple separated? Courts confronted this exact
situation in the famous case K.M. v. E.G. (33). After E.G.
was unable to conceive with the use of her own eggs, her doc-
tor suggested using K.M.’s ova; K.M. signed a generic oocyte
donor form that she had seen only 10minutes beforehand and
signed it with the intention to parent, believing that some pro-
visions (including promising not to discover the recipient's
identity, and relinquishing parental rights) would not pertain.
Using K.M.’s oocytes, E.G. conceived twins, whom both
women parented. After the two separated, E.G. contested
K.M.’s parental claims. Although the lower court ruled that
K.M. was an ‘‘oocyte donor’’ and not a parent, the California
Supreme Court reversed, finding that both women intended to
conceive a child that would be raised in their home, and that
K.M.’s genetic relationship to the children was evidence of a
parental relationship under California law (based on the
UPA). In addition, it invalidated the oocyte donor waiver,
reasoning that parents could not use agreements to limit or
eliminate a child's right to support, distinguishing women
in K.M.’s situation from sperm and true gamete donors. The
Florida Supreme Court reached a similar result in D.M.T. v.
T.M.H. (35), declaring unconstitutional a state statute
requiring that oocyte providers in same-sex relationships
relinquish parental claims, regardless of whether they intend
to parent offspring.
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Obergefell v.
Hodges (18) recognizing the right of same-sex couples to
marry, many same-sex patients enter into ART arrangements
on the assumption that each will be fully recognized as a legal
parent. Nonetheless, because of the patchwork of state
parentage laws and uncertainties that may remain, to ensure
joint legal parentage most ART lawyers counsel their LGBTQ
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clients to obtain either a joint parentage order or an adoption
order, depending on the jurisdiction (36).
Alleged Negligence: Embryo Mix-Ups and
Donor Genetic Testing
Other complicated third-party reproduction scenarios
concern testing of sperm and oocyte donors for genetic dis-
eases and negligent embryo mix-ups. These cases are much
more unusual than parentage and custody determinations,
but the lack of legal precedents makes them more
challenging.
Regarding donor genetic testing, courts have ruled that
clinics have a legal duty both to test oocyte donors for
certain common genetic conditions and to communicate
those test results to intended parents. In B.F. et al. v. Repro-
ductive Medical Associates of New York, LLP (37), New
York's highest state court, the New York Court of Appeals,
adjudicated the malpractice claims of parents who under-
went IVF with the use of anonymous-donor oocytes and
learned after the child's birth that their child had fragile X
syndrome from the donated oocytes, a genetic disorder
causing intellectual disabilities and other conditions. The
court found that the clinic's failure to test the oocyte donor
for fragile X deviated from the medical standard of care, that
this nondisclosure meant that the clinic did not obtain the
couples' informed consent to procedures, and that the cou-
ple's claim met the criteria for punitive damages. In a second
case, Paretta v. Medical Offices for Human Reproduction
(38), parents alleged that their clinic had not told them
that their oocyte donor had tested positive for the cystic
fibrosis gene, that they had not tested the husband for the
condition, and that their child was born with the condition.
A New York court ruled that the couple could obtain the
financial costs of the child's care and treatment but noted
that a child conceived through ART did not have a right
to be born free of genetic defects, just like a child conceived
through sexual intercourse, and thus did not have ‘‘more
rights and expectations’’ than other children (38).
One additional case involving an embryo mix-up illus-
trates how women who use oocyte donors can have a
weaker (or nonexistent) claim to parental rights because
they lack a genetic relationship to the child. In Robert B.
v. Susan B. (39), a married couple, Robert and Denise, un-
derwent IVF, creating embryos with the use of an oocyte
donor and Robert's sperm. Although some of the embryos
were transferred to Denise, three were also mistakenly given
to Susan, a single woman in the same practice who was sup-
posed to receive an anonymously donated embryo. Both De-
nise and Susan became pregnant but did not learn of the
clinic's error until 10 months after the children's births. Rob-
ert and Denise sued after they asked Susan to voluntarily
relinquish her parental rights and she refused. The court
determined that Robert was the biologic father (not a sperm
donor) and could get visitation rights but dismissed Denise
from the case because she was not the child's biologic or
gestational mother. The court reasoned that the facts in
this strange case were very different from the usual third-
party reproduction scenario, in which an intended mother
contracted with a surrogate. Thus, the court ruled, Susan
was the legal mother because she had given birth to the
child and was the intended mother.
Oocyte Donor Compensation
In legal disputes concerning oocyte donor compensation,
courts have adjudicated two issues: whether donor compen-
sation guidelines of professional medical societies like
ASRM and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology
(SART) were ‘‘price-fixing’’ in violation of antitrust laws; and
whether payments to oocyte donors were taxable under fed-
eral income tax laws.
In Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Med-
icine et al. (40), an oocyte donor brought a class action lawsuit
on behalf of other donors against ASRM, SART, and a number
of fertility clinics, alleging that these organizations had
engaged in ‘‘price-fixing’’ by establishing and enforcing
oocyte donor payment guidelines. The suit was settled out
of court: under the settlement, ASRM and other defendants
would remove language in its guidelines stating that pay-
ments over $5,000 should be justified and payments over
$10,000 were not appropriate, and ‘‘will not set forth any dol-
lar amounts of recommended or requiring levels or ranges of
compensation’’ (34).
In Perez. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (41), the
U.S. Tax Court ruled that payments to oocyte donors were
taxable for federal income tax purposes. An oocyte donor
who had received a large payment for donated oocytes did
not report the payment on her annual tax return, and there-
after received notice of nonpayment from the Internal Reve-
nue Service. She appealed, arguing that under her oocyte
donor contract that payment was for pain and suffering,
and should not be taxable. The U.S. Tax Court disagreed,
ruling that compensation for pain and suffering resulting
from consensual performance of a service contract must be
included in gross income.
EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES AND
CLINICAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Novel legal issues and new clinical challenges are likely to
arise with the advent of oocyte freezing and proliferation of
‘‘egg banks.’’ As an initial question, legally determining
what an egg bank is will affect what type of law applies
and thus what obligations, responsibilities, and vulnerabil-
ities may arise regarding egg banks and those who use
them. It is a cardinal rule of health law that physicians have
a ‘‘duty to warn’’ their patients, and through them their family
members, about genetically related conditions (42). Some
seminal cases suggest that physicians who are told or other-
wise know that patients will not inform their family may
have an obligation to directly warn family members (43).
Translating that health law principle into gamete donation
raises challenging questions. Are genetically related offspring
now ‘‘family’’? If an egg bank is an independent corporate en-
tity that receives a donor's retrieved and cryopreserved oo-
cytes from a fertility center for storage and subsequent
dissemination, does any ‘‘duty to warn’’ of subsequently
VOL. 110 NO. 7 / DECEMBER 2018 1213
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discovered genetic anomalies extend to it? If not, how are
genetically affected individuals protected as the duty to
warn anticipates? But if such a duty does extend to egg banks,
how would it be applied and how far would it extend? A
similar common law duty exists in adoption law, where an
agency may be liable for fraud or negligence, often described
as ‘‘wrongful adoption,’’ if they fail to disclose known herita-
ble conditions of a birth parent to prospective adoptive par-
ents (44). It may simply be too soon to know with any
degree of certainty what legal duties will apply to egg banks
or other nonmedical programs that facilitate oocyte donation.
Despite ASRM guidelines that require ‘‘permanent records’’ of
donation to be maintained (6), neither ASRM nor the govern-
ment has established a uniform donor registry to track either
genetically related information or donor health issues.
Another emerging legal issue involves the reality that an-
onymity in gamete donation, as it was understood in earlier
times, no longer exists. In an era of direct-to-consumer ge-
netic tests, donor-conceived offspring, donors, and their rel-
atives are all learning of one another's existence and
identities, and all donor programs should ensure that their
documents, websites, and other representations are updated
to reflect that reality. Outside of the United States, numerous
countries prohibit or restrict anonymous donation altogether,
or provide a unilateral right for donor-conceived offspring to
learn their donors' identities upon reaching a certain age,
regardless of any prior agreement as to anonymity (45, 46).
Moreover, international bodies of law recognize the right to
know one's identity as a central right of an individual (47, 48).
In general, providers should place renewed emphasis on
counseling both oocyte donors and recipients about the
importance of and opportunities for mental health consulta-
tions and legal advice before donating or receiving donor oo-
cytes. New technologic innovations will undoubtedly change
standard-of-care practices. For example, egg freezing will
necessitate different legal norms and clinical practices.
Donors can provide oocytes that are cryopreserved and then
banked, ready for intended parents' selection, adding inter-
personal distance between donor and recipient, eliminating
any individual contracts or limits, and making donor oocytes
more like donor sperm. Egg banks and providers, not intended
parents, will initially choose whether a particular oocyte
donor is desirable. Banking donor oocytes makes it easier to
standardize practices such as genetic testing of donors, poten-
tially providing recipients with greater information. But re-
cipients who can choose oocytes directly from an egg bank
without contract negotiations might be less likely to obtain
any nonrequired mental health or legal counseling. Similarly,
egg banking will mean that both donors and intended parents
will sign standardized forms instead of negotiating custom-
ized contracts. This, in turn, reduces donors’ ability to place
conditions on donor oocytes, such as prohibiting intended
parents from donating surplus embryos to others. Moreover,
given fast-moving genetic testing developments and
extended storage and use possibilities, providers will face
difficult ethical decisions, such as determining when previ-
ously banked oocytes have been adequately screened based
on current testing standards. These challenges can often be
addressed, if not met, through transparency, enhanced coun-
seling for oocyte donors and recipients, and stronger re-
minders that relevant policies and laws are subject to change.
CONCLUSION
Although it is still a relatively recent procedure, oocyte dona-
tion has changed medical and legal landscapes, enabling
women, men, and couples who previously could not conceive
to build families and paving the way for other advances, such
as egg-freezing technology. Legislatures have struggled to
keep up with the rapid pace of technologic innovation,
rendering essential more flexible resources such as profes-
sional guidelines and judicial opinions. Thus, partnerships be-
tween medical and legal professional associations, as well as
incorporation of professional medical standards into statu-
tory law and judicial opinions, will continue to improve med-
ical and legal resources, helping to prevent many conflicts
and promote more just outcomes in those disputes that arise.
Acknowledgments: The authors thank Judy Daar for her
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